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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Officers searched the home of Chelsi Urias while they conducted a residence check on a
male parolee. Although the male parolee told his parole officer he slept on a couch in the living
room, the officer disbelieved him and searched the entire house. When the officer went down
the stairs to the basement, he looked through an open doorway and saw a bong in the bedroom
belonging to Ms. Urias. The officers then proceeded to search Ms. Urias’s bedroom, without her
consent and absent a warrant, and found drug paraphernalia and a baggie containing
methamphetamine residue.

Ms. Urias moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the

warrantless search of her bedroom and home. The district court denied her motion, and Ms. Urias
entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving her right to appeal the district court’s denial of her
motion.
On appeal, Ms. Urias contends the district court erred by denying her motion where the
parolee’s search and seizure waiver did not make lawful the officers’ presence in the basement of
Ms. Urias’s home. Ms. Urias further asserts that the officers unlawfully searched Ms. Urias’s
bedroom without a warrant, and the district court erred by implicitly finding the plain view
exception made the search of her bedroom lawful. The plain view exception did not excuse the
warrantless search of the bedroom as that exception only applies to the seizure of the contraband
item observed in plain view. The evidence found during the warrantless search of Ms. Urias’s
bedroom should have been suppressed as the fruits of an unlawful search, and this Court should
reverse the district court’s order.

1

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On June 25, 2019, Parole Officer Alboucq arrived at Chelsi Urias’s home to do a
residence check of parolee Bryce Amos. (2/11/20 Tr., p.9, L.22 – p.12, L.25; p.19, Ls.19-25.)
Mr. Amos was on felony parole, and he was being supervised by Officer Alboucq.1 (2/11/20
Tr., p.17, Ls.13-17.) When the occupants of the home did not answer the door, Officer Alboucq
went around the back and was let into the home by children.2 (2/11/20 Tr., p.14, L.4 – p.15,
L.8.) Mr. Amos saw Officer Alboucq standing inside the home and “pretty much” welcomed
him further inside the home. (2/11/20 Tr., p.15, Ls.6-9.) Two other individuals were living at
the house—Ms. Urias and Ms. Urias’s father. (2/11/20 Tr., p.18, L.5 – p.19, L.11.) Mr. Amos
told Officer Alboucq that he was sleeping on the couch at the home. (2/11/20 Tr., p.19, Ls.1014; p.33, Ls.22-24.)

Officer Alboucq doubted Mr. Amos’s information, as there were no

blankets or pillows on the couch. (2/11/20 Tr., p.19, Ls.15-17; p.35, Ls.4-14.) However, there
also was a backpack next to the couch that gave Officer Alboucq reason to believe that
Mr. Amos was transient. (2/11/20 Tr., p.19, Ls.15-18; p.35, Ls.4-16.)
Officer Alboucq told Mr. Amos he was going to do a quick walk-through of the house;
and then he went around the house, knocked on one bedroom door, and then went downstairs to
look around. (2/11/20 Tr., p.19, L.19 – p.20, L.10.) When Officer Alboucq went into the
basement, he looked into a bedroom where he saw a bong used for smoking illegal narcotics.
(2/11/20 Tr., p.20, L.15 – p.21, L.12.) Officer Alboucq then questioned Mr. Amos about how

1

A parole agreement, which included a search and seizure waiver, was admitted as an exhibit at
the hearing; however, it was not signed by Mr. Amos. (2/11/20 Tr., p.15, Ls.14-23; State’s
Exhibit 2.) Officer Alboucq testified that he had “never” “seen a parolee released without
signing that agreement.” (2/11/20 Tr., p.17, Ls.18-21.)
2
Officer Alboucq did not have a body camera or any type of voice recorder; thus, the facts
surrounding the entire encounter and search were based solely on the officer’s recollection
and/or notes. (2/11/20 Tr., p.29, L.19 – p.31, L.23.)
2

often he went into Ms. Urias’s bedroom. (2/11/20 Tr., p.25, Ls.5-15.) Mr. Amos said he went
down there “just every once in a while,” and admitted to using drugs in Ms. Urias’s room.3
(2/11/20 Tr., p.25, Ls.13-15; p.27, Ls.4-18.)

Officer Alboucq and the other officer went

downstairs and fully searched the bedroom. (2/11/20 Tr., p.24, L.24 – p.25, L.4; p.27, Ls.19-23.)
In addition to the bong, Officer Alboucq recalls that might have also have noticed a pipe in plain
view. (2/11/20 Tr., p.28, Ls.5-18.) After a “systematic search” of the room for contraband not in
plain view, the officers found a pink box containing a small baggie with methamphetamine
residue and additional items of drug paraphernalia, including a syringe loaded with
methamphetamine. (2/11/20 Tr., p.28, Ls.13-18; PSI, p.36.)
The search was performed without Ms. Urias’s consent. (2/11/20 Tr., p.37, Ls.5-10.)
Officer Alboucq did not speak to Ms. Urias before he searched her bedroom. (2/11/20 Tr., p.28,
Ls.2-4.)

In fact, neither officer asked Ms. Urias for permission to search her bedroom despite

being aware that it was a bedroom and not a common area of the home. (2/11/20 Tr., p.37, Ls.510; p.44, Ls.11-14.)
Based on the items found pursuant to the search of the bedroom, the State charged
Ms. Urias by Information with felony possession of a controlled substance. (R., pp.17-19, 2426.)
Ms. Urias moved to suppress the drug-related evidence on the grounds that it was
obtained in violation of her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the U.S.
Constitution and Article 1, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution.4

3

(R., pp.31-33; 38-44.)

Officer Alboucq testified that, four months after this incident, he listened to a jail call between
Mr. Amos and another female in which Mr. Amos described a sexual relationship with
Ms. Urias. (2/11/20 Tr., p.26, Ls.12-25.)
4
Although the attorney who presented and argued Ms. Urias’s suppression motion asserted that
the State had violated both her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and her rights under
3

Specifically, she asserted that the search of her bedroom was warrantless and violated her Fourth
Amendment rights, because Mr. Amos’ search and seizure waiver did not extend to Ms. Urias,
and the fact that he slept on the couch in Ms. Urias’s living room did not give Mr. Amos
authority to consent to a search of the entire residence. (R., p.42.) The State filed a response
asserting “the search fell within the probation and parole’s exception to the warrant requirement
for another resident of the home.” (Aug., pp.1-21.) The State argued that Officer Alboucq’s
supervision records and his experience justified his belief that Mr. Amos and Ms. Urias were in
an intimate relationship. (Aug., p.3.) The State argued that Ms. Urias did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the visible portions of her bedroom, and that Mr. Amos, as Ms. Urias’s
intimate partner, had access to her bedroom.

(Aug., p.4.) The State claimed that Officer

Alboucq had a reasonable suspicion that the room contained evidence that Mr. Amos was in
violation of the terms of his probation. (Aug., p.4.).
On February 11, 2020, the district court held a hearing on the motion. (See generally
2/11/20 Tr.) The State introduced as evidence an unsigned parole agreement for Bryce Amos,
which condition no. 8 provided:
Parolee will submit to a search of person or property, to include residence and
vehicle, at any time and place by any agent of Field and Community Services and
s/he does waive constitutional right to be free from such searching.
(State’s Exh. No. 2.) The State argued that the officer reasonably believed that Mr. Amos had
the authority to consent to search the entire house. (2/11/20 Tr., p.56, L.2 – p.57, L.19.) The
defense conceded that Officer Alboucq could rely upon the information that Mr. Amos resided at
the home, but he could only search where Mr. Amos said he was sleeping—the couch and the

Article I § 17 of the Idaho Constitution, no specific argument was made asserting the Idaho
Constitution. (R., pp. 31-33; 38-44; see 2/11/20 Tr.) Therefore, Ms. Urias will rely upon Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence in this appeal.
4

common areas. (2/11/20 Tr., p.58, Ls.9-13.) The defense argued that Mr. Amos did not have
any authority to give permission or consent for the officers to search beyond the couch and
common areas. (2/11/20 Tr., p.58, Ls.1-13; R., p.42.) Alternatively, the defense argued the
officers had probable cause to obtain a search warrant once they saw the bong, but that they
could not lawfully search the rest of the bedroom absent a warrant. (2/11/20 Tr., p.58, Ls.14-18.)
The district court entered a written order denying Ms. Urias’s motion to suppress.
(R., pp.57-66.) The court held that, “[b]ased upon the information Officer Alboucq possessed
from the Offender History report and observations in the house, . . . it was reasonable for him to
believe that Amos’ access and control in the residence was not limited to the living room.”
(R., p.63.) The court concluded that Officer “Alboucq was not required to accept Amos’ claim
that he just slept on the couch and was limited to that part of the house. His observations and the
information in the Offender History file justified his reasonable suspicions and he was entitled to
search further throughout the house.”5 (R., p.65.) Regarding the consent to search waiver in
Mr. Amos’s parole agreement, the district court concluded that, despite lacking Mr. Amos’s
signature, the agreement was authentic and the State established the Department of Correction’s
policy of not allowing an offender to be released on parole absent a signature. (R., p.65.)
Ms. Urias entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine. (3/9/20
Tr., p.5, L.15 – p.7, L.1; p.11, Ls.13-17; R., pp.70-73.)

The State agreed to recommend

probation. (3/9/20 Tr., p.8, Ls.4-7; R., p.70.) As part of the plea agreement, Ms. Urias reserved

5

The district court also noted that Officer Alboucq’s “reasonable belief was confirmed” by
Mr. Amos’s admission after the search. (R., p.63 n.1.) After the search of the basement for
unknown persons, Officer Alboucq interviewed Mr. Amos, who told Officer Alboucq that he
went down to the basement bedroom “just every once in a while.” (2/11/20 Tr., p.25, Ls.11-15.)
When Mr. Amos was asked if he had ever used drugs in Ms. Urias’s room, he admitted to
Officer Alboucq that he had “gotten high down there before.” (2/11/20 Tr., p.27, Ls.6-9.)
5

her right to appeal the district court’s order denying her motion to suppress. (3/9/20 Tr., p.5,
L.15 – p.7, L.1.)
The district court sentenced Ms. Urias to four years, with two years fixed, suspended
execution of the sentence, and placed Ms. Urias on probation for three years.6 (6/22/20 Tr., p.23,
L.15 – p.24, L.6; R., pp.85-91.) Ms. Urias timely appealed from the district court’s judgment of
conviction. (R., pp.92-94.)

6

Ms. Urias’ sentence in this case was ordered to be served concurrently with her sentence in
Bannock County case number CR-2017-3019, a case in which Ms. Urias pled guilty to grand
theft. (11/25/19 Tr., p.36, Ls.4-18.)
6

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Urias’s motion to suppress?

7

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Urias’s Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Mr. Amos’s Fourth Amendment waiver did not provide officers with apparent authority

to search the basement of Ms. Urias’s home, and therefore Officer Alboucq was not lawfully
present on the stairs when he saw the bong in Ms. Urias’s basement bedroom. At the time of his
walkthrough, it was unreasonable for Officer Alboucq to believe that Mr. Amos had apparent
authority to agree to Officer Alboucq’s entry into the basement area, or that the basement was a
common area used by Mr. Amos. Officer Alboucq knew only that Mr. Amos was staying with a
girl, he slept on the couch on the main floor of the house, and Ms. Urias’s bedroom was in the
basement. Thus, Officer Alboucq was not lawfully present on the basement stairs when he saw
the drug paraphernalia. Further, the plain view exception did not authorize the warrantless
search of the entire bedroom, as that exception only applies to the seizure of the contraband item
observed in plain view. For these reasons Ms. Urias asserts that the district court erred when it
denied her motion to suppress.

B.

Standard Of Review
The Court uses a bifurcated standard to review a district court’s order on a motion to

suppress. State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 408 (2012); State v. Hunter, 156 Idaho 568, 571
(Ct. App. 2014). “The Court accepts the trial court’s findings of fact if supported by substantial
evidence.” State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 234 (2005). “At a suppression hearing, the power to
assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence and draw factual
inferences is vested in the trial court.” Hunter, 156 Idaho at 570. This Court exercises free

8

review of “the trial court’s application of constitutional principles to the facts found.” Danney,
153 Idaho at 408.

C.

Mr. Amos Lacked Actual Or Apparent Authority To Consent To A Full Search Of
Ms. Urias’s Home; Thus, The District Court Erred When It Determined That It Was
Reasonable For Officer Alboucq To Believe That Mr. Amos Had Access To The Areas
Of The House Searched
Ms. Urias does not challenge the officers’ authority to enter her home, based upon

Mr. Amos’s claim that he lived there, and his parole waiver of his right to be free from searches
of his person or property. (See State’s Exh. 2.) However, Mr. Amos’s parole waiver did not
provide authority for the officers to search throughout Ms. Urias’s residence including the
basement and her bedroom. Ms. Urias asserts on appeal that her basement and her bedroom
were unlawfully searched absent consent and absent a warrant.
“The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects citizens from
unreasonable search and seizure.” State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796 (2003). “A search and
seizure, conducted without a warrant issued on probable cause, is presumptively unreasonable.”
Hansen, 138 Idaho at 796.

“When a warrantless search or seizure is challenged by the

defendant, the State bears the burden to show that a recognized exception to the warrant
requirement is applicable.” Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829, 833 (2002); State v. Hunter, 156
Idaho 568, 570 (Ct. App. 2014) (same).
The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is always “the reasonableness in all the
circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.” Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968). Reasonableness hinges on “on a balance between the public
interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law
officers.” United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975).

9

A felony probationer’s consent to searches as a condition of probation provides
justification for warrantless searches of the probationer’s home. State v. Turek, 150 Idaho 745,
747 (Ct. App. 2011). However, when the basis for a search is consent, the State must conform
its search to the limitation placed upon the consent. Id. 150 Idaho at 749. “The standard for
measuring the scope of consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of objective
reasonableness.” Id. (citing Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991)).
A warrantless search is valid under the Fourth Amendment if it was conducted pursuant
to voluntary consent of a person having the authority to consent. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
US. 218 (1973). “[T]he consent of one who possesses common authority over premises or
effects is valid against the absent, nonconsenting person with whom that authority is shared.”
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974).

Alternatively, a warrantless search

conducted pursuant to consent granted by a person who does actually have authority to consent,
may nevertheless be reasonable if the State proves the officer had an objectively reasonable
belief that the consenting person had the authority to consent. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S.
177 (1990).
The Idaho Supreme Court recently addressed the rights of a person whose property is
searched, based upon a third-party’s Fourth Amendment waiver. In State v. Garnett, the Court
held:
Consenting to a search is a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement,
and Idaho law has made it clear that a probationer can consent to a search of all
their property as a condition of probation. State v. Hansen, 151 Idaho 342, 345,
256 P.3d 750, 753 (2011). A probationer’s consent to search as a condition of
probation constitutes a waiver of Fourth Amendment rights. Id. Yet, “[t]he burden
is on the State to show that the consent exception applies.” Id. at 346, 256 P.3d at
754.
The person consenting to a search must have either actual authority to consent to a
search, or authority that is reasonably apparent. Id. Actual authority to consent to

10

a home search rests upon “mutual use of the property by persons generally having
joint access or control for most purposes.” Id. (quoting United States v. Matlock,
415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974)). “A warrantless
search can still be upheld if the person consenting does not actually have authority
as long as the police officer reasonably believes that the person giving consent has
the authority to do so.” Id.
165 Idaho 845, 848 (2019), reh’g denied (2019). At issue in Garnett was not the initial entrance
of a home prior to a search, but “the correct legal standard by which to determine the permissible
bounds of a search of a probationer’s belongings that has already begun.” Id. The Garnett Court
concluded that the district court correctly relied upon the holding in State v. Barker, 136 Idaho
728 (2002), in which the Court determined that the officer need only have “reasonable
suspicion” that the property was owned, controlled, or possessed by the probationer who
consented to the search. 165 Idaho at 848.
Consent must come from a person with actual authority to consent, or from a person
whose authority is reasonably apparent. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 106 (2006). A
third party has actual authority to consent to a search if the third party shares common authority
over the premises with the defendant. State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 219 (1999).
As the United States Supreme Court explained:
Common authority ... rests ... [upon] mutual use of the property by persons
generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable
to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in
his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number
might permit the common area to be searched.
Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7. Thus, co-inhabitants assume the risk that one of them may consent
to a search of common areas and the items within those common areas. State v. Johnson, 110
Idaho 516, 523 (1986). However, such consent only extends to common areas over which the
inhabitants share authority. Barker, 136 Idaho at 731; State v. Robinson, 152 Idaho 961, 965
(Ct. App. 2012).

11

Alternatively, apparent authority may be found in circumstances where an officer
reasonably, but erroneously, believes that the third party had authority to consent to a search. Id.
152 Idaho at 965-66. The officer’s determination is “judged against an objective standard:
would the facts available to the officer at the moment . . . ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in
the belief’ that the consenting party had authority over the premises?” Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497
U.S. 177, 188 (1990) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968)). The determination of
apparent authority is fact-driven; it requires consideration of the totality of the circumstances.
Brauch, 133 Idaho at 220.

“Apparent authority must be determined on the facts and

circumstances known to the police at the time of the search; what they learned later or what is
proved after the fact is irrelevant.” State v. Westlake, 158 Idaho 817, 821 (Ct. App. 2015).
In Robinson, the Court of Appeals considered whether the co-inhabitant had authority to
consent to a search of the defendant’s master bedroom and adjoining master bathroom. 152
Idaho at 966-69. Although the bathroom had been used by other persons in the house while the
officers were present, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s determination that the
defendant’s bedroom and bathroom were private to the defendant.

Id. 152 Idaho at 969.

“[B]ecause [the probationer co-inhabitant]’s actual authority to consent to a search of Robinson’s
home extended only so far as common areas and items in the common areas over which the
inhabitants of Robinson’s home shared authority, the district court did not err by concluding that
[the probationer co-inhabitant] lacked actual authority to consent to a search of Robinson’s
private bedroom and bathroom.” Id.
In this case, the district court concluded, “Based on the information Officer Alboucq
possessed from the Offender History report and observations in the house, the court finds it was
reasonable to him to believe that Amos’ access and control in the residence was not limited to

12

the living room.”

(R., p.63.)

The court wrote, “Alboucq was justified in his reasonable

suspicion that Amos lived at the residence and had access to the areas of the house searched.”
(R., p.64.) The district court denied the motion to suppress, concluding,
As in the Barker7 case this court finds that Alboucq was justified in his reasonable
suspicion that Amos lived at the residence and had access to the areas of the
house searched. Additionally, there were no barriers or other indicators that
Amos could not access and use the downstairs. Officer Alboucq was not required
to ask about possession and control over every area of the home, and even when
he did, he was not required to rely on those responses. Alboucq was not required
to accept Amos’ claim that he just slept on the couch and was limited to that part
of the house. His observations and the information in the Offender History file
justified his reasonable suspicions and he was entitled to search further
throughout the house.
(R., pp.64-65.)
However, the officers were aware that there were two bedrooms in the house, with one in
the basement belonging to Ms. Urias and one belonging to her father. (11/27/18 Tr., p.33, Ls.519; p.33, L.25 – p.34, L.2; p.35, Ls.4-9.)

They had information—and had received no

information to the contrary—that Mr. Amos was sleeping on the couch. (2/11/20 Tr., p.33,
Ls.22-24; p.35, Ls.4-14.) Thus, at the time the drug item was observed in plain view through a
bedroom doorway, the officer understood that the room was a bedroom and not a common area
such as a kitchen or bathroom. (2/11/20 Tr., p.21, Ls.2-23; p.25, Ls.11-15.)
After the drug item was observed, when the officers did the “systematic search of the
room,” they knew that it was Ms. Urias’s bedroom, and that Mr. Amos had only been down there
“just every once in a while.”

(2/11/20 Tr., p.21, Ls.2-23; p.25, Ls.11-15; p.28, Ls.5-12.)

Ms. Urias’s bedroom was searched with the understanding that the officers were searching
Ms. Urias’s belongings—there was no evidence that either officer believed the room they were
searching was a kitchen or bathroom—a room commonly used by multiple residents.
7

State v. Barker, 136 Idaho 728 (2002).
13

See

Robinson, 152 Idaho at 969 (holding district court did not err by concluding that the probationer
lacked actual authority to consent to a search of Robinson’s private bedroom and bathroom even
though other residents could access the bathroom). Nor was there evidence that the officer
reasonably believed at the time he walked down to the basement that the basement contained
common areas used by Mr. Amos. See Robinson, 152 Idaho at 966 (“[T]he analysis related to a
determination of whether a third party had apparent authority to consent to a search of premises
is limited to what officers knew prior to a search of such premises.”). It was only after Officer
Alboucq went downstairs and saw the bong that he spoke to Mr. Amos about his use of the
downstairs, generally.
The district court found that, in addition to the officer’s observations in the house, the
Offender History report supported the officer’s reasonable belief that Mr. Amos’s control of the
house extended beyond the living room. (See State’s Exh. 1.) However, these notes convey no
information that would support a conclusion that Mr. Amos had control over the basement area
of Ms. Urias’s home. The report provides information that, on January 11, 2019, Mr. Amos was
living at 568 2nd E. St. with Selena Brewer and Chelsea Urias. (State’s Exh. 1, p.5.) Two days
later, a residence verification was competed at the address and the “house is a mess, looks like it
was just moved into. Bryce reported that the girl he is living with had all of her stuff brought
from her storage shed.” (State’s Exh. 1, p.6.) The notes indicate that, as of June 3, 2019,
Mr. Amos was “still living at 568 2nd E. St.,” but that Mr. Amos’s car was not running and “his
friend Selena was giving him a ride for now. He may be looking to move in with her soon.”
(State’s Exh. 1, pp.1, 9.) This exhibit does not confirm any type of dating relationship between
Mr. Amos and Ms. Urias. Nor does the information in the exhibit give Officer Alboucq any
reason to believe Mr. Amos was sharing a bedroom with Ms. Urias.
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Officer Alboucq testified that he was aware that Mr. Amos had told his prior supervising
officer, “that he was staying with a girl in Ririe.” (2/11/20 Tr., p.26, Ls.5-6.) Officer Alboucq
assuming that the girl in Ririe and Mr. Amos were dating, but did not have any additional
information to confirm his initial assumption. (2/11/20 Tr., p.26, Ls.8-14.) Officer Alboucq’s
belief that Mr. Amos and Ms. Urias were in a dating relationship was unsupported by any
evidence and it was therefore unreasonable for him to conclude that Ms. Urias and Mr. Amos
were sharing Ms. Urias’s basement bedroom. The district court erred by finding the officer had
reasonable suspicion that Mr. Amos had access to the basement and the basement bedroom.

D.

The Plain View Exception Did Not Authorize The Warrantless Search Of Ms. Urias’s
Bedroom
Assuming, arguendo, that Officer Alboucq was lawfully present on the stairs leading

down to the basement when he saw the bong through the open bedroom doorway, he was
nonetheless required to obtain a warrant before searching the bedroom. During the warrantless
search of Ms. Urias’s bedroom, Officer Alboucq seized the bong, and then discovered a loaded
syringe and a small baggie containing methamphetamine residue, which were not seen in plain
view.

(2/11/20 Tr., p.29, Ls.13-18.)

Ms. Urias was charged with possession of

methamphetamine, based upon the officers finding these items. (R., pp.7-9, 17-19, 24-26.)
While seizure of the bong visible in plain view may have been lawful under the plain view
doctrine, the warrantless search of the rest of the bedroom was not.8

8

The sanctity of the home has been well protected under the Fourth Amendment, which states,
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
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In this case, the district court wrote, “[i]f an officer has probable cause to believe that an
object in plain view is criminal contraband or reasonable suspicion that it is evidence of a
violation of a term of probation, the officer may seize the item under the plain view doctrine.”
(R., p.62 (citing State v. Ruck, 155 Idaho 475, 481-82 (2013)).) The district court determined
that Officer Alboucq “observed in plain view from the bottom of the stairs what appeared to be a
bong used for ingesting controlled substances. Upon observing these items, Officer Alboucq
conducted a more thorough search . . . Additional drugs and paraphernalia were located and the
defendant, along with Amos, was placed under arrest.” (R., p.64.) In so finding, the court
implicitly held that the search of the bedroom was lawful pursuant to the plain view exception.
However, the district court’s factual finding is clearly erroneous, and the court did not
correctly apply the plain view exception. The plain view doctrine, as articulated by the United
States Supreme Court, provides that “if police are lawfully in a position from which they view an
object, if its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful
right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant.” Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508
U.S. 366, 375 (1993). The plain view doctrine operates to make lawful the seizure of the
contraband object, but does not operate to make lawful the warrantless search of the entire room
in which the contraband object was found. See Ruck, 155 Idaho at 482.
The Idaho Supreme Court has similarly explained that the plain view exception “permits
warrantless seizures where certain conditions are met. First, the officer must lawfully make an
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added). “[W]hen it comes to the Fourth Amendment, the
home is first among equals.” Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013). “In terms that apply
equally to seizures of property and to seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a
firm line at the entrance to the house.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980). In
contrast, there is a reduced privacy expectation in a vehicle. See Thornton v. United States, 541
U.S. 615, 622 (2004) (holding officer may search the passenger compartment of a car incident to
the lawful arrest of a recent occupant who has a “temporal or special relationship to the car at the
time of the arrest and search.”).
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initial intrusion or otherwise properly be in a position from which she or he can view a particular
area. Second, it must be immediately apparent to the police that the items they observe may be
evidence of crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.” Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho
148, 155 (2008) (citation omitted). The Baldwin Court discussed how “[t]he second requirement
is met when an officer has probable cause to believe the item in question was associated with
criminal activity.” Id. at 155-56.
Here, while Officer Alboucq saw the bong in the plain view from his vantage point on the
basement stairs, that observation did not authorize his warrantless search of Ms. Urias’s bedroom
in its entirety. Upon viewing what appeared to be drug paraphernalia, Officer Alboucq was
lawfully able to seize the item he viewed.

However, the court’s implicit finding that the

bedroom was lawfully searched pursuant to the plain view of the bong (R., p.64), was an
incorrect application of the plain view exception. The plain view doctrine only authorizes a
seizure of the contraband item the officer observed in plain view, but does not authorize a further
warrantless search. See State v. Claiborne, 120 Idaho 581, 586 (1991) .
The district court incorrectly applied the plain view exception to excuse the search of
Ms. Urias’s bedroom absent a warrant. The district court erred by implicitly finding the plain
view exception made lawful the warrantless search of Ms. Urias’s bedroom.
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CONCLUSION
Ms. Urias respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s order denying
her motion to suppress, vacate her judgment of conviction, and remand this case for further
proceedings.
DATED this 7th day of April, 2021.
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SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 7th day of April, 2021, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant

SJC/eas

18

